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Abstract
What is the role of the Church in politics? Is there a way
to justify such role? This paper will explore the answer to
this problem in the area of deliberative democracy, and
will seek to strengthen the idea that political and
democratic discourse may allow for religious arguments,
if and only if these arguments also purport to express
public values. To shed light onto this problem, I will bring
into dialogue John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas, most
especially with emphasis on their respective ideas
concerning civil society, and hope to reconcile the role of
politics and religion in Philippine democracy.
Church involvement in politics has always been controversial, es-
pecially in third world democracies like the Philippines. This paper intends
to examine the involvement of the Catholic Church in Philippine political
affairs, and find legitimate justifications for such crucial engagement. His-
torically, the Catholic Church in the Philippines has always played an im-
portant role in charting the course of Philippine politics, most notably dur-
ing the dark years of Ferdinand Marcos which ended in the First People
Power Revolution in 1986. The Church has also been active in its protest
against controversial proposals such as abortion, reproductive health
(House Bill 4110), divorce and many others. The Church and its leaders
has also served as a beacon of hope for a vibrant democracy in the Phil-
ippines.
But of course, this involvement is not without its opposition. There
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are sectors who argue that Church involvement in political issues violates
the separation of Church and State. There is also a view that sees the
Church as meddling in the areas concerning women’s rights to reproduc-
tive health. But what really is the role of the Church in politics? Is there a
way to justify such role? This paper will explore the answer to this prob-
lem in the area of deliberative democracy, and will seek to strengthen the
idea that political and democratic discourse may allow religious arguments,
if and only if these arguments also purport to express public values. To
shed light into this, I will bring into dialogue John Rawls and Jürgen
Habermas, most especially on their idea of civil society, and hope to rec-
oncile the role of politics and religion in Philippine democracy.
Civil Society and Comprehensive Doctrines
According to Rawls, civil society, or the “background culture”,
includes “the culture of churches and associations of all kinds, and institu-
tions of learning at all levels, especially universities and professional schools,
scientific and other societies” (Rawls 1999, 134). Civil society belongs to
the nonpublic use of reason, which comprises many of its questions (Rawls
1993, 220). It is undeniable, however, that members of civil society may
base their political opinions on certain religious insights. Church doctrines
which oblige the individual to respect human life from the moment of con-
ception can form part of the convictions of individuals, and as such, are
important in the way they comprehend political matters. The person who
professes belief in God is the same person who votes, decides, and per-
forms other acts in the public realm as a social being. But there can be
conflict when one introduces comprehensive doctrines in public debates
in a liberal democratic society, for bringing them in can offend others who
may not share the convictions of those who profess such. Such is the
reason why the public realm must be independent from religious argu-
ments.
This neutrality is in view of the very nature of public reason. In a
democratic society, according to Rawls, “public reason is the reason of
equal citizens who, as a collective body, exercise the final political and
coercive power over one another in enacting laws and in amending their
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constitution” (Ibid., 214). Simply put, public reason in this sense is always
political in nature. For instance, people come into an agreement to a con-
stitution that defines public policy. They also agree on the way upon which
public institutions are to be established. Public reason, however, for Rawls,
does not apply to the background culture. (See Rawls 1993, 215)
Public reason, he says, “does not apply to our personal delibera-
tions and reflections about political questions, or to the reasoning about
them by members of associations such as churches and universities” (Ibid.).
Political power rests in the constitutional framework of government, and
this framework is independent of the religious convictions of the back-
ground culture. Any liberal democratic state must therefore be neutral.
(See Audi 1997, 39) Generally, it can be said that setting aside compre-
hensive norms is understandable because the basis of political stability is
the consensus shared by all on matters pertaining to the general interest of
the public. The constitution, for instance, is a product of this agreement.
Any legislation can only be legitimate if it is constitutional. Thus, no single
religious opinion from the background culture can override what has been
established constitutionally.
Questioning the Idea of Neutrality
In the context of third world cultures, it is important to note that
religion plays a great part in the lives of people, and therefore in the kind
of government they wish to establish. Put into the context of Philippine
society, which is 85% Catholic, the presence of Catholic values permeate
the many areas of politics, including the Constitution and the laws passed
by Congress. More importantly though, members of civil society in the
Philippines are influenced by strong religious values. The Church has been
a strong voice on contentious political issues like abortion, divorce, and
the death penalty, to cite a few examples. As one Filipino scholar notes,
involvement in social issues can take place at the level of basic ecclesias-
tical communities where the parish is able to generate some kind of dyna-
mism (Gaspar 1997, 151).
The Church finds itself as an active participant in Philippine politi-
cal issues. For instance, the church through its many affiliated associations
have delivered their arguments against the bill on Reproductive Health
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Care in legislative hearings called for by Congress. The Church has also
been active in the peace process, another political issue. In the 1996
Mindanao Peace Congress, “church leaders categorically stated that peace
is the wholeness of life where every person can live with dignity. Peace
must be based on justice for all, whether they are Christians, Muslims, or
Indigenous peoples” (Gaspar 1997, 168). Moreover, the Church also
takes part in electoral advocacy. During Philippine elections, the Church
and civil society groups openly endorse candidates who support their
agenda. As Karl Gaspar notes, “there is no denying that in a number of
areas, the Church, despite its claim to be neutral, did support certain can-
didates, directly or indirectly (Ibid., 156) Thus, it can be said that in the
Philippines, it is impossible for the Church to be neutral.
The Church, according to Gaspar, through its program for
conscientization, supported the people’s aspiration to participate actively
in making decisions that affect them, thus internalizing democratic values,
empowering them towards setting up a just and caring society (Gaspar
1997, 164). For instance, if the Church criticized some development pro-
grams of the government, it was not because the Church was interfering
with government affairs. (Ibid.) In such an instance, the Church was sim-
ply expressing its concern for the poor and the oppressed. What justifies
this involvement?
The Proviso
Rawls says that the idea of public reason specifies at the deepest level the
basic moral and political values that are to determine a constitutional demo-
cratic government’s relation to its citizens and their relation to one another
(Rawls 1999, 132). For Rawls, public reason accounts for the concerns
that involve matters pertaining to political justice. (Ibid., 133) He says, “as
reasons of free and equal citizens, it is the reason of the public; its subject
is the public good concerning questions of fundamental political justice”
(Ibid.). Although he limits the role of civil society, that doesn’t mean that
citizens can no longer hold their government officials accountable. (Ibid.,
135) Citizens, according to him, can realize the function of public reason
in society, and most notably, he says, they have the duty “to repudiate
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government officials and candidates for office who violate public rules”,
which is, in fact, for him, “one of the political and social roots of democ-
racy and is vital to its enduring strength and vigor” (Ibid., 135-36). The
Church in the Philippines, for instance, noted Gaspar, was the first to
publicly denounce martial law, and called for President Marcos to lift it,
long before other groups found the courage to do so (Gaspar 1997, 149).
In today’s Philippine society, the duty of civility is realized in the availabil-
ity of venues to file complaints against corrupt officials through the Office
of the Ombudsman, and the public nature of congressional hearings on
concerns like health, the environment, and education. Participating in for-
mal venues is an inherent requisite because discussions pertaining to the
public must be governed by rules set by the institutions which deal with
public matters. Since members of civil society are better educated than
the majority of the people in the Philippines, they are expected to be the
sounding board in the halls of Congress. As Rawls points out, citizens
have a duty to involve themselves in issues of public concern, for it is an
ideal “that imposes a moral, not a legal duty – to be able to explain to one
another on those fundamental questions how the principles and policies
they advocate and vote for can be supported by the political values of
public reason” (Rawls 1993, 217).
Rawls designates the duty of civility as a moral duty. (Ibid.) Such
duty is not a legal obligation, but it is a duty which proceeds from the ideal
of political justice. Citizens must seek, actively participate, and hope for
the realization of what is good for society. Thus, in filing complaints or
seeking remedies for grievances against government officials, one is per-
forming something not for his own private sake but for the sake of the
public. It is important to note that participation in the public sphere in the
Philippines is heavily indebted to the values taught by the Church. Not
only that, the Church itself is active in promoting its stand on public issues.
For instance, combating the government’s promotion of artificial means of
birth control has pre-occupied family-life programs of the Church (Gaspar
1997, 163).
Given this influence of the Church in Philippine political culture, it
is important here to introduce the notion of the proviso, where Rawls
says, “reasonable comprehensive doctrines, religious or non-religious, may
be introduced in public political discussion at any time, provided that in
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due course political reasons and not reasons given solely by comprehen-
sive doctrines, are presented” (Rawls 1997, 777; also in Habermas 2006,
5-6). Rawls requires that the introduction of religious arguments must be
grounded on the principles of political justice and that the values that these
religious arguments purport to express must also be public values. (Ibid.)
In Philippine political culture, basing political decisions in the Church’s
teachings regarding respect for human life is not at all arbitrary, for this
value is something that Filipinos do share, a value which they have in fact
chosen when they ratified the constitution.
Poor Filipinos (30 percent of the population or 24 million people)
find strength in the Church. If the Church demands from the government
that it protects the interests of the poor, a stance that can be based on the
doctrine of love for one’s neighbor (a Catholic teaching), the Church is
advocating something that is fair and rational. It is also at the same time a
demand for responsible politics. It is worthy to note that the “Philippines
was the first country to articulate its vision of becoming a Church of the
Poor” (Gaspar 1997, 150). Concern for human life and care for the poor
are matters of political justice. I also believe that these are two public
values that any democratic society would strongly uphold.
In Mindanao, one of the major islands in the Philippines, many
dioceses involve lay leaders in most decision-making processes through
regular assemblies attended by priests, religious and lay people to pro-
mote active lay participation (Gaspar 1997, 163). Such assemblies pre-
pare and immerse church leaders and lay people in the ideals of democra-
tization. It is in these assemblies where the Church echoes its positions
and hold public dialogues. The promotion of Christian values in the public
sphere by the Church help define the moral viewpoint of the public. By
opposing abortion, the Church is simply trying to protect the life of the
unborn child, and is acting on the basis of human values. The contribution
of the Church on matters of public concern is vital. Philippine society as a
whole counts on the Church as a moral voice on public issues. This is
done within the context of a constitution that promotes and protects the
value of human life.
Because of the active involvement of the Church in forming public
opinion, its influence on the issue of reproductive health has been felt by
most Filipinos. Naida Pasion states, “nowhere is the influence of the Church
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more felt than in government programs on reproductive health. Nurses
deliberately absented themselves during the scheduled days for IUD in-
sertions rather than defy the teachings of the Church” (Pasion 1997, 226).
It must be noted that there is no direct intervention on the part of the
Church. What it does is voice out its opinion on many vital public issues.
Habermas says, “religious traditions have a special power to articulate
moral intuitions, especially with regard to vulnerable forms of communal
life. In the event of corresponding political debates, this potential makes
religious speech a serious candidate to transporting possible truth con-
tents” (Habermas 2006, 10).
Religion in the Public Sphere
“The liberal state”, according to Habermas, “has an interest in
unleashing religious voices in the political public sphere, and in the partici-
pation of religious organizations as well” (Ibid.). If allowing the balance
between religious and public values contributes to consensus in society,
then there is no reason to silence the voice of the Church on public matters
like abortion, divorce, and reproductive health care. Habermas says that
“in a secular state only those political decisions are taken to be legitimate
as can be impartially justified in the light of generally accessible reasons, in
other words equally justified vis-à-vis religious and non-religious citizens,
and citizens of different confessions” (Ibid., 5) Habermas writes, “a liberal
state must not discourage religious persons and communities from also
expressing themselves politically” (Ibid., 10). The Church cannot be ex-
cluded in the public debate on abortion and other morally sensitive issues.
Religion and politics are intertwined in Philippine political culture because
Filipinos consider the Church as their protector from the excesses of their
government. Some religious values have become part of public morality.
It does not appear as an imposition of one religion to another, because in
issues like abortion and reproductive health care, the values of “respect
for human life” and “respect for the dignity of the human person” concern
public morality in the Philippines. Kent Greenawalt affirms such when he
says that in settling the issue regarding the infusion of religious norms on
matters of public policy, “much depends on history, culture, the religions,
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and other comprehensive views that people hold” (Greenawalt 2003, 275).
Habermas says that religious doctrines potentially deliver the truth on im-
portant public matters. (Habermas 2006, 12) They must therefore be
allowed in the public given the legitimate reasons. There is no arbitrariness
in bringing in religious arguments if they are supported by equally reason-
able arguments other than the religious arguments themselves. (See Rawls
1997, 777) Habermas requires, however, that these arguments be trans-
lated before they are allowed in the public sphere. (See Habermas 2006,
10-11) This translation means finding the political reasons for these reli-
gious arguments, meaning, their accessibility in terms of “what citizens
owe one another as good reasons for their political statements and atti-
tudes” (Habermas 2006, 11). He adds that the truth content of religious
contributions can enter into the institutionalized practice of deliberation
and decision-making if the necessary translation occurs in the pre-parlia-
mentary domain, i.e., in the public sphere itself (Ibid., 12)
For Habermas, the political public sphere acts as a sounding board
for problems that must be processed by the political system because they
cannot be solved elsewhere (Habermas 1996, 359). For him, civil society’s
attunement to societal problems in the private sphere can make it effective
in transmitting and amplifying reactions to the public sphere (Ibid., 367).
The reason for this openness, is that the public is made up of citizens who
seek acceptable interpretations of their social interests, and who may want
to have an influence on institutionalized opinion and will-formation (Ibid.).
This explains the important role that the Church plays in the Philippine
public sphere.
Habermas explains that the public sphere must amplify the pres-
sure of problems, that is, not only detect and identify problems, but also
convincingly and influentially thematize them, furnish them with possible
solutions (Ibid., 359). Obviously, social and political problems are issues
that religious and lay people talk about in meetings and even in informal
gatherings. Even with the absence of the formality of public hearings, as-
semblies contribute to public enlightenment on important issues. As an
example, the Mindanao Assembly for Peace, convened by Archbishop
Fernando Capalla in Davao City, committed itself, Christians, Muslims
and Indigenous peoples alike, to become peacemakers, called on gov-
ernment to provide basic services essentially in depressed areas, and con-
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duct peace education (Gaspar 1997, 167).
The Church always play a vital function in the public sphere. Ac-
cording to Habermas the political system must remain sensitive to the
influence of public opinion (Habermas  1996, 367). Habermas acknowl-
edges the influence which may come from religious leaders suggesting that
this political influence supported by public opinion is converted into politi-
cal power – into a potential for rendering binding decisions (Ibid., 363).
He assigns a big role for civil society, pointing out that, “basic constitu-
tional guarantees alone, of course, cannot preserve the public sphere, and
civil society from deformation. The communication structures of the pub-
lic sphere must rather be kept intact by an energetic civil society” (Ibid.,
369).
Democracy is healthier with a more active civil society in the pub-
lic sphere. Jean Cohen asserts that the survival and expansion of basic
rights depend very much on political cultures that allow and even promote
its mobilization (Cohen 2002, 217). The active role of the Church makes
the people more involved in open discussions on political issues, thereby
empowering an otherwise helpless populace. This is strongly grounded in
the fact that “the Church in the Philippines believes that ministering to the
needs of the poor and the oppressed is a moral option, a moral obliga-
tion” (Gaspar 1997, 163).
Critique of the Liberal Tradition
The liberal tradition’s exclusion of comprehensive doctrines, ac-
cording to Wolterstorff, seems to be telling people to “step out of their
religious community and enter the public debate without any appeal to
their religious convictions” (Wolterstorff 1997, 172). Kent Greenawalt
suggests, granting that there will be disagreements, or that some people
might disagree, it can still be said that “we can revert to the possibility that
one set of background beliefs might be better than any other, and that
human beings have the capacity to identify sound background beliefs”
(Greenawalt 2003, 262). For Wolterstorff, it seems to be too much of a
generalization to throw away religious arguments simply because they are
religious without even examining their value in the discussion of matters
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that concern the life and well-being of citizens (See Wolterstorff 1997,
180).
The intention of engaging in politial dialogue is to provide better
choices for the people. For Wolterstorff, it is not necessary that religious
arguments are shared by all. (See Wolterstorff, 181) For him, it is suffi-
cient that the argument stands and that the majority supports it (Ibid.). As
Greenawalt adds, “if a respected religious authority like the pope, a di-
vinely inspired text or one’s personal sense of how God relates to human
beings suggest that we should help those who are less fortunate,” (Ibid.,
269) it should not be taken as something negative.
As Wolterstorff suggests, instead of forbidding to offer religious
reasons in the public space, why not invite people to continue saying with
civility what they do believe (Wolterstorff 1997, 180). For him, anybody
who has a sound religious argument and wants to contribute to dialogue
must be admitted, for the healthy exchange of ideas is good for democ-
racy. (Ibid.) Wolterstorff seems to be saying that the constitutional re-
straint that Rawls’ proviso requires is unnecessary. (See Habermas 2006,
11) He seems to be suggesting that any sound religious opinion must be
listened to and that it is sufficient that the majority agrees to these argu-
ments (See Wolterstorff 1997, 181).
Majority Religion and Constitutional Essentials
Comprehensive doctrines tend to shake the balance of political
culture in any society for these doctrines can present themselves as impo-
sitions from outside for the members of society who do not share such
convictions. (See Habermas 2006, 12) Recalling Rawls, he says that po-
litical autonomy is “realized by citizens when they act from the principles
of justice that specify the fair terms of cooperation they would give to
themselves when fairly represented as free and equal persons” (Rawls
1993, 77). Freedom and equality are the essentials of a liberal and demo-
cratic society. (Ibid., 216) This means, according to Habermas, that citi-
zens are meant to respect one another as free and equal members of their
political community (Habermas 2006, 5).
Given that in the liberal state only secular reasons count, citizens
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who adhere to a faith are obliged to establish a kind of balance between
their religious and secular convictions (Ibid., 5-6). For Habermas, public
deliberation needs some kind of restraint before any religious opinion is
admitted. (Ibid., 12) He finds the proposal of Wolsterstorff problematic
(Ibid.). Habermas says, since no institutional filter is envisaged between
the state and the public domain, Wolterstorff’s version does not exclude
the possibility that policies and legal programs will be implemented solely
on the basis of the religious or the confessional beliefs of a ruling majority
(Ibid., 11). He adds that parliaments in this sense will become a battlefield
of religious beliefs and governmental authority can evidently become the
agent of the religious majority that asserts its will and thus violating the
democratic procedure (Ibid.). There is a great possibility in this sense of a
majority religion simply imposing its will on the whole populace if constitu-
tional safeguards are not provided for. Legislatures cannot just allow any
religious opinion. Constitutional grounds must be set as basis before any
religious argument is admitted.
Habermas says that it seems that for Wolterstorff, the argument
between different conceptions of justice grounded in competing religions
and world views can never be solved by the common presupposition of a
formal background consensus (Ibid., 12). According to Habermas,
Wolterstorff rejects the whole idea of a reasonable background consen-
sus on constitutional essentials (Ibid.). Habermas is against the position of
Wolterstorff because for Habermas the democratic procedure has the
power to generate legitimacy precisely because it both includes all partici-
pants and has a deliberative character (Ibid.). It is possible for other reli-
gions not to compromise on what they believe is right. But agreement can
still be possible, because “conflict of existential values can be contained
by losing any political edge against the background of a presupposed
consensus on constitutional principles” (Ibid.). In this sense, constitutional
essentials are important to legitimize whatever religious argument are in-
troduced in the public sphere. The constitution safeguards the public sphere
from any possible excesses that any majority religion might do, which in
the end will only disturb the spirit of social cooperation and undermine
social unity which the constitution as the fundamental law of the land pro-
tects. Religious arguments, therefore, must find resonance in the constitu-
tion to be legitimate.
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Civic Virtue and Theo-ethical Equilibrium
One author asserts that the question is not whether religion and
politics can be mixed; they are mixed and will continue to be mixed (Audi
1997, 38). We have explained above why accommodating religious val-
ues in the public sphere is not at all inconsistent with democracy and hu-
man freedom given that they find resonance in the constitution. To be able
to elaborate on the relation between religious insights and secular norms,
it is important to explain the meaning of civic virtue. For Robert Audi, civic
virtue is the individual’s way of being socially responsible without having
to disregard the values of his religion, with the former playing a major role
on the latter. (Ibid., 54) He says further, “in a society that is complex,
pluralistic, and so, inevitably somewhat divided, civic virtue implies trying
to take reasonable positions on important issues” (Ibid., 48).
Audi says, if one’s only reason is to promote religious devotion,
then even if one is expressing a kind of religious virtue, one is not exhibit-
ing civic virtue (Ibid., 57). Such seems far from the mind of the Church or
of civil society. If anything, the Church and civil society are simply advo-
cating what is just and reasonable for all Filipinos. Audi says that the con-
cept of civic virtue realizes what he calls a theo-ethical equilibrium (Ibid.,
62). He says, “I propose a principle of theo-ethical equilibrium: where
religious considerations appropriately bear on matters of public morality
or of political choice, religious persons have a prima facie obligation – at
least insofar as they have civic virtue – to seek an equilibrium between
those considerations and relevant secular standards of ethics and political
responsibility” (Ibid.).
Civic virtue implies doing one’s responsibility as an individual us-
ing the balance between one’s moral and religious convictions. It implies
responsible political participation in a liberal democracy (Ibid., 48). Such
an idea proceeds from what Audi calls a secular rationale, which is “in-
tended to benefit people within a religious tradition, for instance in differ-
ent denominations or even in the same denomination, as well as to facili-
tate good relations between different religious traditions, and between
religious and non-religious people” (Ibid., 56). Such rationality, therefore,
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intends to foster dialogue among different sectors in society. This balance
requires that “a seemingly sound moral conclusion that goes against scrip-
tures or one’s established religious tradition should be scrutinized for er-
ror; a religious demand that seems to abridge moral rights should be stud-
ied” (Ibid., 52) Those who advocate abortion on the basis of reproduc-
tive rights should be able to examine their conscience if the life of the
unborn child is worth compromising for the sake of their secular view. If
the Church defends the rights of the unborn child by using religious values,
it should not be barred from doing so simply because one thinks that the
argument is based on some religious ground. The Church must be allowed
and does have good reasons for its arguments. Audi thinks that this ar-
rangement does not defy reason. (Ibid., 53) He adds that inasmuch as
secular reasons may change one’s religious views, religious considerations
can also lead to the revision of one’s secular moral views. (Ibid.)
For Audi, the separation of church and state does not require that
churches should not publicly take moral positions, even if there is political
controversy about them (Ibid., 65). Articulating reasons based on reli-
gious grounds like the teachings of the Church on the value of human life in
order to argue against a proposed law that it perceives to be morally
unacceptable should help enlighten rather than complicate the discussion.
In view of the importance of human life as a whole, the Church has a big
role to play in every democratic society. The separation of Church and
state does not mean that the Church has to be helpless in the face of grave
social and moral problems. The role of the Church in the public sphere is
clear. In the context of a third world country like the Philippines, it can be
said that “the Church needs to truly practice what it preaches in terms of
lay empowerment. It should support the laity in playing their role in the
political arena, not only in casting their votes, but in pressuring the govern-
ment to allocate resources for the poor, to promote ecology and human
rights” (Gaspar 1997, 166).
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